On the Expressive Power of Sub-Propositional Fragments of Modal Logic by Bresolin, Davide et al.
D. Cantone and G. Delzanno (Eds.): Seventh Symposium on
Games, Automata, Logics and Formal Verification (GandALF’16)
EPTCS 226, 2016, pp. 91–104, doi:10.4204/EPTCS.226.7
c© D. Bresolin, E. Mun˜oz-Velasco & G. Sciavicco
This work is licensed under the
Creative Commons Attribution License.
On the Expressive Power of Sub-Propositional Fragments of
Modal Logic∗
Davide Bresolin
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
University of Bologna (Italy)
davide.bresolin@unibo.it
Emilio Mun˜oz-Velasco
Department of Applied Mathematics
University of Ma´laga (Spain)
emilio@ctima.uma.es
Guido Sciavicco
Department of Mathematics and Computer Science
University of Ferrara (Italy)
guido.sciavicco@unife.it
Modal logic is a paradigm for several useful and applicable formal systems in computer science.
It generally retains the low complexity of classical propositional logic, but notable exceptions exist
in the domains of description, temporal, and spatial logic, where the most expressive formalisms
have a very high complexity or are even undecidable. In search of computationally well-behaved
fragments, clausal forms and other sub-propositional restrictions of temporal and description logics
have been recently studied. This renewed interest on sub-propositional logics, which mainly focus
on the complexity of the various fragments, raise natural questions on their the relative expressive
power, which we try to answer here for the basic multi-modal logic KN. We consider the Horn and
the Krom restrictions, as well as the combined restriction (known as the core fragment) of modal
logic, and, orthogonally, the fragments that emerge by disallowing boxes or diamonds from positive
literals. We study the problem in a very general setting, to ease transferring our results to other
meaningful cases.
1 Introduction
The usefulness and the applicability of modal logic is well-known and accepted. Propositional modal
logic generally retains the decidability of the satisfiability problem of classical propositional logic, but
extends its language with existential modalities (diamonds, to express possibility) and their universal
versions (boxes, to express necessity), allowing one to formalize a much wider range of situations. To
simply cite a few, modal logic has been applied not only to philosophical reasoning (e.g., epistemolog-
ical, or metaphysical reasoning - see [7, Chapter 1] for an historical perspective), but also to computer
science, being paradigmatic of the whole variety of description logics [6], temporal logics [15], and
spatial logics [1].
Until very recently, clausal fragments of modal logic has received little or no attention, with the
exception of a few works which are limited to the Horn fragment [12, 14, 20]. An inversion in this
tendency is mainly due to the newborn interest in sub-propositional fragments of temporal description
logics [3], temporal logics [2], and interval temporal logics [4, 10]. Such results, which mainly concern
the complexity of various sub-propositional fragments of description and temporal logics raise natural
questions on their the relative expressive power, which we try to answer here in a very general form.
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self-adaptive systems’ (D. Bresolin and G. Sciavicco), and the Spanish Project TIN15-70266-C2-P-1 (E. Mun˜oz-Velasco).
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There are two standard ways to weaken the classical propositional language based on the clausal
form of formulas: the Horn fragment, that only allows clauses with at most one positive literal [17], and
the Krom fragment, that only allows clauses with at most two (positive and negative) literals [19]. The
core fragment combines both restrictions. Orthogonally, one can restrict a modal language in clausal
form by disallowing either diamonds or boxes in positive literals, obtaining weaker fragments that we
call, respectively, the box fragment and diamond fragment. By combining these two levels of restrictions,
one may obtain several sub-propositional fragments of modal logic, and, by extensions, of description,
temporal, and spatial logics. The interest in such fragments is originated by the quest of computationally
well-behaved logics, and by the observation that meaningful statements can be still expressed under
the sub-propositional restrictions. The satisfiability problem for classical propositional Horn logic is
P-complete [13], while for classical propositional Krom logic (also known as the 2-SAT problem) it
is NLOGSPACE-complete [21], and the same holds for the core fragment. Interestingly enough, the
satisfiability problem for quantified propositional logic (QBF), which is PSPACE-complete in its general
form, becomes P when formulas are restricted to binary (Krom) clauses [5].
Sub-propositional modal logic has been studied mainly under the Horn restriction. The basic modal
logic K, which is PSPACE-complete, remains so under the Horn restriction, but the satisfiability prob-
lem for other cases becomes computationally easier, such as S5, which goes from being NP-complete
to P-complete [12, 14]. In [2, 11], the authors study different sub-propositional fragments of Linear
Temporal Logic (LTL). By excluding the Since and Until operators from the language, and keeping
only the Next/Previous-time operators and the Future and Past box modalities, it is possible to prove
that the Krom and core fragments are NP-hard, while the Horn fragment is still PSPACE-complete (the
same complexity of the full language). Moreover, the complexity of the Horn, Krom, and core fragments
without Next/Previous-time operators range from NLOGSPACE (core), to P (Horn), to NP-hard (Krom).
Where only a universal (anywhere in time) modality is allowed their complexity is even lower (from
NLOGSPACE to P). Temporal extensions of the description logic DL-Lite have been studied under simi-
lar sub-propositional restrictions, and similar improvements in the complexity of various problems have
been found [3]. Sub-propositional fragments of the undecidable interval temporal logic HS [16], have
also been studied. The Horn, Krom, and core restrictions of HS are still undecidable [10], but weaker re-
strictions have shown positive results. In particular, the Horn fragment of HS without diamonds becomes
P-complete in two interesting cases [4, 9]: when it is interpreted over dense linear orders, and when the
semantics of its modalities becomes reflexive. On the bases of these results, sub-propositional interval
temporal extensions of description logics have been introduced in [4]. Other clausal forms of temporal
logics, not included in the above classification, have been developed to synthesize systems from logical
specifications, as the logical counterpart of deterministic automata. The most relevant example is the
fragment GR(1) of LTL [8], for which synthesis is exponentially more efficient than for full LTL.
The purpose of this paper is to consider sub-propositional fragments of the multi-modal logic KN,
and study their relative expressive power in a systematic way. We consider two different notions of
relative expressive power for fragments of modal logic, and we provide several results that give rise to
two different hierarchies among them, leaving only a few open problems. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first work where sub-Krom and sub-Horn fragments of KN have been considered.
2 Preliminaries
Let us fix a unary modal similarity type as the set τ of modalities α1,α2, . . . ,αN ∈ τ , and a denumerable
set P of propositional letters. The modal language KN associated to τ and P contains all and only the
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formulas generated by the following grammar:
ϕ ::=⊤ | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ϕ |✸α ϕ | ✷αϕ , (1)
where p ∈P , and α ∈ τ labels the diamond ✸α and box ✷α . Other classical operators, such as → and
∧, can be considered as abbreviations. A Kripke τ-frame is a relational τ-structure F = (W,{R}α∈τ ),
where the elements of W 6= /0 are called possible worlds, and, for each α ∈ τ , Rα ∈W ×W is an acces-
sibility relation. A Kripke structure over the τ-frame F is a pair M = (F ,V ), where V : W → 2P is an
evaluation function, and we say that M models ϕ at the world w, denoted by M,w  ϕ , if and only if:
• ϕ =⊤;
• p ∈V (w), if ϕ = p;
• M,w 6 ψ , if ϕ = ¬ψ ;
• M,w ψ or M,w ξ , if ϕ = ψ ∨ ξ ;
• There exists v such that wRαv and M,v ψ , if ϕ =✸α ψ .
• For every v such that wRαv, it is the case that M,v ψ , if ϕ =✷α ψ .
In this case, we say that M is a model of ϕ ; in the following, we (improperly) use the terms models and
structures as synonyms.
In order to define sub-propositional fragments of KN we start from the clausal form of KN-formulas,
whose building blocks are the positive literals:
λ ::=⊤ | p |✸α λ | ✷αλ , (2)
and we say that ϕ is in clausal form if it can be generated by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= λ | ¬λ | ∇(¬λ1∨¬λ2∨ . . .∨¬λn∨λn+1∨λn+2∨ . . .∨λn+m) | ϕ ∧ϕ , (3)
where ∇ =✷αi✷α j . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
s
and s ≥ 0. Sometimes, we write clauses in their implicative form:
∇(λ1∧ . . .∧λn → λn+1∨ . . .∨λn+m),
and we use ⊥ as a shortcut for ¬⊤. By md(λ ) we mean the modal depth of λ , that is, the number of
boxes and diamonds in λ . Sub-propositional fragments of KN can be now defined by constraining the
cardinality and the structure of clauses: the fragment of KN in clausal form where each clause in (3)
is such that m ≤ 1 is called Horn fragment, and denoted by KHornN , and when each clause is such that
n+m ≤ 2 it is called Krom fragment, and it is denoted by KKromN . When both restrictions apply we
denote the resulting fragment, the core fragment, by KcoreN . We use KBoolN instead of KN to highlight
that no restrictions apply. It is also interesting to study the fragments that can be obtained from both
the Horn and the Krom fragments by disallowing, respectively, the use of ✷αor ✸α in positive literals.
In this way, the fragment of KHornN obtained by eliminating the use of diamonds (resp., boxes) in (2) is
denoted by KHorn,✷N (resp., KHorn,✸N ). By applying the same restrictions to KKromN and KcoreN , one obtains
the pair KKrom,✸N and K
Krom,✷
N from the former, and the pair K
core,✸
N and K
core,✷
N , from the latter. All such
sub-Horn, sub-Krom, and sub-core fragments are generally called box and diamond fragments.
It should be noted that in the literature there is no unified definition of the different modal or temporal
sub-propositional logics. Our definition follows the one by Nguyen [20], with a notable difference: while
the definition of clauses is the same, we choose a more restrictive definition of what is a formula. Hence,
a formula of KHornN by our definition is also a Horn formula by [20], but not vice versa. However, since
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every Horn formula by [20] can be transformed into a conjunction of Horn clauses, the two definitions
are equivalent. The definition of [12, 14] is equivalent to that of Nguyen, and hence to our own. Other
approaches force clauses to be quantified using a universal modality that asserts the truth of a formula in
every world of the model. The universal modality is either assumed in the language [2] or it is definable
using the other modalities [9, 10], but the common choice in the literature of modal (non-temporal) logic
is simply excluding the universal modality. Our results hold in either case: when the universal modality
is present (as part of the language or defined), and clauses are always universally quantified, they become
even easier to prove.
There are many ways to compare the expressive power of different modal languages. In our context,
two different concepts of expressive equivalence arise naturally. The first one, that we call weak expres-
sivity, compares formulas (and models) with the same set of propositional letters. More formally, given
two modal logics L and L′ interpreted in the same class of relational frames C , we say that L′ is weakly
at least as expressive as L if, fixed a propositional alphabet P , there exists an effective translation (·)′
from L to L′ such that for every model M in C , world w in M, and formula ϕ of L, we have M,w ϕ if
and only if M,w ϕ ′. We denote this situation with Lw
C
L′, and we omit C if it is clear from the con-
text. The second notion, that we call strong expressivity, allows the translations to use a finite number of
new propositional letters, and can be formally defined as follows. For every model M = (F ,V ) based on
the set of propositional letters P and every P ′ ⊇P , we say that the model MP ′ = (F ,V P ′) based on
P ′ is a extension of M if V |P =V ′|P . Then, we say that L′ is at least as expressive as L if there exists
an effective translation (·)′ that transforms any L-formula ϕ written in the alphabet P into a L′-formula
written in a suitable alphabet P ′ ⊇P , such that for every model M in C and world w in M, we have that
M,w  ϕ if and only if there exists an extension M′ of M such that M′,w  ϕ ′. We denote this situation
with L C L′. Now, we can say that L and L′ are weakly equally expressive if L wC L′ and L′ wC L,
and they are equally expressive if LC L′ and L′ C L; in the former case we write L≡w L′, and in the
latter case we write L ≡ L′. Finally, L is weakly less expressive than L′ if L w
C
L′ and L 6≡w
C
L′, and
L is less expressive than L′ if L C L′ and L 6≡C L′; in the former case we write L≺wC L′, while in the
latter one we write L≺C L′. Clearly, two logics can be equally expressive and not weakly so, but not the
other way around.
Given L and L′ such that L is a syntactical fragment of L′, in order to prove that L is (weakly) less
expressive than L′ we show a formula ψ that can be written in L′ but not in L. To this end we proceed
by contradiction, assuming that a translation ϕ ∈ L does exist, and by building a model for ψ that is
not (and, in the case of strong relative expressiveness, cannot be extended to) a model of ϕ , following
three different strategies: we modify the labeling (Theorem 1 and Theorem 2), we modify the structure
(Theorem 8 and Theorem 9), or we exploit a property of L′ that L does not possess (Theorem 5 and
Theorem 7). The two different levels that emerged from the above discussion give rise to two different
hierarchies: (i) a weak hierarchy that compares fragments within the same propositional alphabet, and
(ii) a strong hierarchy that takes into account any finite extension of the propositional alphabet.
Adding new propositional letters to facilitate translations from a fragment to another is a common
practice, for example, to prove that every n-ary clause in propositional logic can be transformed into
an equi-satisfiable set of ternary clauses. In this sense, it can be argued that the weak hierarchy is less
general; nonetheless, both the weak and the strong hierarchies contribute to the comprehension of the
relative expressive power of sub-propositional fragments. Indeed, both notions have been already studied
under different names [18]: our weak hierarchy captures the notion of equivalently rewritability, while
the strong one captures the notion of model-conservative rewritability.
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3 Horn, Krom, and Core Fragments
In this section, we study the relative expressive power of the basic multi-modal logic KBoolN and its sub-
propositional fragments with both boxes and diamonds. From now on, we focus on the class of all
relational frames, and we omit it from the notation. We start by comparing the Horn fragment KHornN
with the full propositional language.
Theorem 1. KHornN ≺w KBoolN .
Proof. Since KHornN is a syntactical fragment of KBoolN , we know that KHornN w KBoolN . It remains to be
proved that there exists a formula that belongs to KBoolN and that cannot be translated to KHornN within the
same propositional alphabet. Consider the KBoolN -formula
ψ ≡ p∨q,
and suppose, by contradiction, that there exists a KHornN -formula ϕ such that for every model M over the
propositional alphabet {p,q}, and every world w, we have that M,w  ψ if and only if M,w  ϕ . We
can assume that ϕ = ϕ1∧ . . .∧ϕl, where each ϕi is a positive literal, the negation of a positive literal, or
a Horn clause. To simplify our argument, if ϕi = λ (resp., ϕi = ¬λ ) we shall think of it as the clause
(⊤ → λ ) (resp., (λ → ⊥)). Let us denote by C(ϕi) the set of propositional letters that occur in the
consequent of ϕi: clearly, C(ϕi) is always a singleton, or it is the empty set. Now, consider a model
M = 〈F ,V 〉, where F is based on the set of worlds W , and let w ∈W be a world such that M,w 6 ψ .
Such a model must exist since ψ is not a tautology. Since ϕ is a conjunction of Horn clauses, we have
that there must exist at least one clause ϕi = ∇(λ1∧ . . .∧λn → λ ) such that M,w 6 ϕi. Hence, there must
exist a world w′ such that M,w′  λ1∧ . . .∧λn but M,w′ 6 λ . At this point, only three cases may arise
(since we are in a fixed propositional alphabet):
• C(ϕi) = {p}. In this case, we can build a new model M′ = 〈F ,V ′〉 such that:
V ′(p) =V (p) and V ′(q) =W.
Since q holds on every world of the model, we have that M′ satisfies ψ on every world, and, in
particular, on w. However, being λ1, . . . ,λn positive literals, they are true on M′ whenever they
were true on M, which means that M′,w′  λ1∧ . . .∧λn. Now, consider the positive literal λ , we
want to prove that, for each world v ∈W , M,v 6|= λ implies M′,v 6|= λ . We reason by induction
on md(λ ). If md(λ ) = 0, then λ = p; since M and M′ agree on the valuation of the proposition
p, we have the claim. Suppose, now, that md(λ ) > 0. Clearly, λ =✸α λ ′ or λ = ✷αλ ′; assume,
first, that λ =✸αλ ′. If M,v 6✸αλ ′, then, for every t ∈W such that vRα t, we have that M, t 6 λ ′;
by inductive hypothesis, for every t ∈W such that vRα t, we have that M′, t 6 λ ′, proving that, in
fact, M′,v 6 ✸αλ ′. Now, assume that λ = ✷α λ ′. If M,v 6 ✷α λ ′, then for some t ∈W such that
vRαt we have that M, t 6 λ ′; by inductive hypothesis, M′, t 6 λ ′, which implies that M′,v 6✷α λ ′.
Since M,w′ 6 λ , the above argument proves that M′,w′ 6|= λ , which means that M′,w′ 6|= ϕi. This
means that M′,w  ψ and M′,w 6 ϕ , contradicting the fact that ψ is a translation of ϕ .
• C(ϕi) = {q}. In this case one can apply the same argument as before, by simply switching the
roles of p and q.
• C(ϕi) = /0. In this case, we can build a new model M′ = 〈F ,V ′〉 such that:
V ′(p) =V ′(q) =W.
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Since p and q hold on every world of the model, we have that M′ satisfies p∨ q everywhere,
and, in particular, on w. However, since the truth of λ does not depend on the valuations of the
propositional letters, we have that, as before, M′,w′  λ1∧ . . .∧λn but M′,w′ 6|= λ , from which we
can conclude that M′,w 6 ϕ .
Therefore, ϕ cannot exist, and this means that ψ cannot be expressed in KHornN within the same proposi-
tional alphabet. So, the claim is proved.
Now, we turn our attention to the relationship between KKromN and KBoolN .
Theorem 2. KKromN ≺w KBoolN .
Proof. Since KKromN is a syntactical fragment of KBoolN , we know that KKromN w KBoolN . It remains to be
proved that there exists a formula that belongs to KBoolN and that cannot be translated to KKromN within the
same propositional alphabet. Now, consider the KBoolN -formula
ψ ≡ p∧q→ r,
and suppose, by contradiction, that there exists a KKromN -formula ϕ , written in the propositional alphabet
{p,q,r}, such that for every model M and every world w we have that M,w ψ if and only if M,w ϕ .
As before, we can assume that ϕ = ϕ1∧ . . .∧ϕl; as in Theorem 1, if ϕi is a literal, we treat it as a special
clause. Let us denote by P(ϕi) the set of propositional letters that occur in ϕi. Now, consider a model
M = 〈F ,V 〉, where F is based on the set of worlds W , and let w ∈W be a world such that M,w 6 ψ .
Such a model must exist since ψ is not a tautology. Since ϕ is a conjunction of Krom clauses, we have
that there must exist at least one clause ϕi = ∇(λ1 ∨ λ2) such that M,w 6 ϕi. Hence, there must exist
a world w′ such that M,w′ 6 (λ1 ∨ λ2). At this point, three cases may arise (since we are in a fixed
propositional alphabet, and we deal with clauses at most binary):
• P(ϕi)⊆ {p,q}. In this case, we can build a new model M′ = 〈F ,V ′〉 such that:
V ′(p) =V (p), V ′(q) =V (q), and V ′(r) =W.
Since r holds on every world of the model, we have that M′ satisfies ψ everywhere, and in particular
on w. However, since the valuation of p and q are the same of M, and since the relational structure
has not changed, we have that M′,w′ 6|= λ1∨λ2, from which we can conclude that M′,w 6 ∇(λ1∨
λ2) and thus that w do not satisfy ϕ .
• P(ϕi)⊆ {p,r}. In this case, we can build a new model M′ = 〈F ,V ′〉 such that:
V ′(p) =V (p), V ′(r) =V (r), and V ′(q) = /0.
Since q is false on every world of the model, we have that M′ satisfies ψ everywhere, and in
particular on w. However, since the valuation of p and r are the same of M, and since the relational
structure has not changed, we have that M′,w′ 6|= λ1∨λ2, from which we can conclude that M′,w 6
∇(λ1∨λ2) and thus that w do not satisfy ϕ .
• P(ϕi) ⊆ {q,r}. In this case, we can apply the same argument as before, by simply switching the
roles of p and q.
Therefore, ϕ cannot exist, and this means that ψ cannot be expressed in KKromN within the same proposi-
tional alphabet.
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Corollary 3. The following results hold:
1. KHornN and KKromN are w-incomparable;
2. KcoreN ≺w KKromN ,KHornN .
Proof. As we have seen in Theorem 1, the KKromN -formula p∨q cannot be translated into KHornN within
the same propositional alphabet, and, as we have seen in Theorem 2, the KHornN -formula p∧ q → r
cannot be translated into KKromN under the same conditions. These two observations, together, prove
that we cannot compare KHornN and KKromN , under the weak notion of expressivity. As an immediate
consequence, since KcoreN = KHornN ∩KKromN , we have that KcoreN ≺w KHornN and KcoreN ≺w KKromN .
4 Box and Diamond Fragments
In this section, we study the relative expressive power for box and diamond fragments, starting with sub-
Horn fragments without diamonds. First of all, we prove the following useful property of the fragments
KHorn,✷N and K
core,✷
N . Consider two models M1,M2 such that all Mi = (F ,Vi) are based on the same
relational frame. We define the intersection model as the unique model MM1∩M2 = (F ,VV1∩V2), where,
for each w ∈W , VV1∩V2(w) =V1(w)∩V2(w).
Lemma 4. KHorn,✷N is closed under intersection of models.
Proof. Let ϕ = ϕ1∧ . . .∧ϕl a KHorn,✷N -formula such that M1,w ϕ and M2,w ϕ , where M1 = (F ,V1)
and M2 = (F ,V2); we want to prove that MM1∩M2 ,w  ϕ . Suppose, by way of contradiction, that
MM1∩M2 ,w 6 ϕ . Then, there must be some ϕi such that MM1∩M2 ,w 6 ϕi. As in Theorem 1, we can
assume that ϕi is a clause of the type ∇(λ1∧ . . .∧λn → λ ). This means that MM1∩M2 ,w′  λ1∧ . . .∧λn
and MM1∩M2 ,w′ 6 λ for some w′. We want to prove that, for each 1 ≤ j ≤ n, both M1 and M2 satisfy λ j
at w′. To see this, we reason by induction on md(λ j). If md(λ j) = 0, then λ j = p for some propositional
letter p; but if MM1∩M2 ,w′  p, then p ∈V1(w′)∩V2(w′), which means that M1,w′  p and M2,w′  p. If
md(λ j) > 0, then λ j = ✷αλ ′. Since MM1∩M2 ,w′  ✷αλ ′, for every v such that w′ Rα v it is the case that
MM1∩M2 ,v  λ ′. Thus, for every v such that w′ Rα v, we know by inductive hypothesis that M1,v  λ ′
and M2,v λ ′. But this immediately implies that M1,w′ ✷αλ ′ and M2,v✷αλ ′, which completes the
induction. Now, we know that M1,w′  λ1∧ . . .∧λn and M2,w′  λ1∧ . . .∧λn; therefore, M1,w′  λ and
M2,w′  λ . A similar inductive argument shows that MM1∩M2 ,w′  λ , implying that MM1∩M2 ,w ϕi; but
this contradicts our hypothesis that MM1∩M2 ,w 6 ϕ .
Theorem 5. The following relationships hold:
1. KHorn,✷N ≺KHornN ;
2. Kcore,✷N ≺KcoreN .
Proof. Since KHorn,✷N (resp., Kcore,✷N ) is a syntactical fragment of KHornN (resp., KcoreN ), we know that
KHorn,✷N  KHornN and K
core,✷
N  KcoreN . It remains to be proved that there exists a formula that belongs
to KHornN (resp., KcoreN ) and that cannot be translated to KHorn,✷N (resp., Kcore,✷N ) over any finite extension
of the propositional alphabet. Here, we prove that this is the case for a KcoreN -formula (which is a KHornN -
formula as well) that cannot be translated to KHorn,✷N (and, therefore, to Kcore,✷N , either). Let P = {p},
consider the KHornN -formula
ψ =✸α p,
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and suppose by contradiction that there exists a propositional alphabet P ′ ⊇P and a KHorn,✷N formula
ϕ written over P ′ such that for every model M over the propositional alphabet P and every world w
we have that M,w  ψ if and only if there exists MP ′ such that MP ′ ,w  ϕ . Let M1 = (F ,V1) and
M2 = (F ,V2), where F is based on the set W = {w0,w1,w2}. Let w0 Rα w1 and w0 Rα w2, and define
the valuation functions V1,V2 as follows:
Vi(w j) =
{
{p} if i = j,
/0 otherwise.
Clearly, M1,w0  ψ and M2,w0  ψ ; since ϕ is a KHorn,✷N -translation of ψ , it must be the case that,
for some extensions MP ′1 and MP
′
2 , we have that MP
′
1 ,w0  ϕ and MP
′
2 ,w0  ϕ . By Lemma 4, their
intersection model MMP′1 ∩MP′2 is such that MMP′1 ∩MP′2 ,w0  ϕ . But p 6∈VV P′1 ∩V P′2 (w) for every w ∈W , so
MMP′1 ∩MP′2 ,w 6 ψ . This contradicts the hypothesis that ϕ is a translation of ψ .
To establish the expressive power of KHorn,✸N and K
core,✸
N with respect to other fragments, we now
prove a closure property similar to Lemma 4. Consider two models M1 = (F1,V1), M2 = (F2,V2)
based on two (possibly different) relational frames F1 = (W1,{R1}α∈τ) and F2 = (W2,{R2}α∈τ). We
define the product model as the unique model MM1×M2 = (FF1×F2 ,VV1×V2), where: (i) FF1×F2 = (W1×
W2,{RR1×R2}α∈τ), that is, worlds are all and only the pairs of worlds from W1 and W2; (ii) for every α ∈ τ ,
(w1,w2)RR1×R2,α(w′1,w′2) if and only if w1R1,α w′1 and w2R2,α w′2, that is, worlds in FF1×F2 are connected
to each other as the component worlds were connected in F1 and F2; and (iii) VV1×V2((w1,w2)) =
V1(w1)∩V2(w2).
Lemma 6. KHorn,✸N is closed under product of models.
Proof. Let ϕ = ϕ1 ∧ . . .∧ϕl be a KHorn,✸N -formula such that M1,w1  ϕ and M2,w2  ϕ . We want to
prove that MM1×M2 ,(w1,w2)  ϕ ; suppose by way of contradiction, that MM1×M2 ,(w1,w2) 6 ϕ . Then,
there must be some ϕi such that MM1×M2 ,(w1,w2) 6 ϕi. As in Theorem 1, we can assume that ϕi
is a clause of the type ∇(λ1 ∧ . . .∧ λn → λ ). This means that MM1×M2 ,(w′1,w′2)  λ1 ∧ . . .∧ λn and
MM1×M2 ,(w′1,w′2) 6 λ for some (w′1,w′2). We want to prove that, for each 1 ≤ j ≤ n, M1 and M2 satisfy
λ j at, respectively, w′1 and w′2. To see this, we reason by induction on md(λ j). If md(λ j) = 0, then
λ j = p for some propositional letter p: by the definition of product, we have that MM1×M2 ,(w′1,w′2)  p
iff p ∈ V1(w′1)∩V2(w′2), which means that M1,w′1  p and M2,w′1  p. If md(λ j) > 0, then λ j =
✸α λ ′. Since MM1×M2 ,(w′1,w′2) ✸αλ ′, then there exists (v1,v2) such that (w′1,w′2)RR1×R2,α(v1,v2) and
MM1×M2 ,(v1,v2)  λ ′. We know by inductive hypothesis that M1,v1  λ ′ and M2,v2  λ ′ and that,
by definition of product, w′1R1,αv1 and w′2R2,α v2. But this immediately implies that M1,w′1  ✸αλ ′
and M2,w′2  ✸α λ ′, which completes the induction. Now, we know that M1,w′1  λ1 ∧ . . .∧ λn and
M2,w′2  λ1∧ . . .∧λn; therefore, M1,w′1  λ and M2,w′2  λ . A similar inductive argument shows that
MM1×M2 ,(w′1,w′2)  λ , implying that MM1×M2 ,(w1,w2)  ϕi, in contradiction with the hypothesis that
MM1×M2 ,(w1,w2) 6 ϕ .
Theorem 7. The following relationships hold:
1. KHorn,✸N ≺KHornN ;
2. Kcore,✸N ≺KcoreN .
Proof. Since KHorn,✸N (resp., Kcore,✸N ) is a syntactical fragment of KHornN (resp., KcoreN ), we know that
KHorn,✸N  KHornN and K
core,✸
N  KcoreN . It remains to be proved that there exists a formula that belongs
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to KHornN (resp., KcoreN ) and that cannot be translated to KHorn,✸N (resp., Kcore,✸N ) over any finite extension
of the propositional alphabet. Here, we prove that this is the case for a KcoreN -formula (which is a KHornN -
formula as well) that cannot be translated to KHorn,✸N (and, therefore, to Kcore,✸N , either). Let P = {p,q},
consider the KHornN -formula
ψ =✷α p → q,
and suppose by contradiction that there exists a propositional alphabet P ′ ⊇P and a KHorn,✸N formula
ϕ written over P ′ such that for every model M over the propositional alphabet P and every world w
we have that M,w  ψ if and only if there exists MP ′ such that MP ′ ,w  ϕ . Let M1 = (F1,V1) and
M2 = (F2,V2), where F1 is based on the set W = {w0,w1} and such that w0 Rα w1, while F2 is based
on {v0} and such that Rα= /0. Define the valuation function V1 as always empty, and let q ∈ V2(v0).
Clearly, M1,w0  ψ and M2,v0  ψ . Since ϕ is a KHorn,✸N -translation of ψ , it must be the case that, for
some extensions MP ′1 and MP
′
2 , we have that MP
′
1 ,w0  ϕ and MP
′
2 ,v0  ϕ . By Lemma 6, their product
model MMP′1 ×MP′2 is such that MMP′1 ×MP′2 ,(w0,v0)ϕ . Notice that q 6∈VV P′1 ×VP′2 (w0,v0) and that (w0,v0)
has no Rα -successors. Hence, we have that MMP′1 ×MP′2 ,(w0,v0)  ✷α p but MMP′1 ×MP′2 ,(w0,v0) 6 q, in
contradiction with the hypothesis that ϕ is a translation of ψ . Therefore, ϕ cannot exist, and this means
that ψ cannot be expressed in KHorn,✸N within any finite extension of the propositional alphabet.
The argument of Theorem 5, based on the intersection of models, cannot be replicated to establish
the relationship between KKrom,✷N and KKromN . It turns out that in this case the possibility of expanding
the propositional alphabet does make the difference, as the following result shows.
Theorem 8. The following relationships hold:
1. KKrom,✷N ≡KKromN ;
2. KKrom,✷N ≺w KKromN .
Proof. The first result is easy to prove. Suppose that
ϕ = ∇1(λ 11 ∨λ 12 )∧∇2(λ 21 ∨λ 22 )∧ . . .∧∇i(λ i1∨λ i2)∧ . . .∧∇l(λ l1∨λ l2)
is a KKromN -formula, where, as always, we treat literals as special clauses. There are two cases. First,
suppose that λ i1 = ✸α λ , for some 1 ≤ i ≤ l, where λ is a positive literal. We claim that the K
Krom,✷
N -
formula
ϕ ′ = ∇1(λ 11 ∨λ 12 )∧∇2(λ 21 ∨λ 22 )∧ . . .∧∇i(¬✷α p∨λ i2)∧∇i✷α(p∨λ )∧ . . .∧∇l(λ l1∨λ l2),
where p is a fresh propositional variable, is equi-satisfiable to ϕ . To see this, let P the propositional
alphabet in which ϕ is written, and let P ′ = P ∪{p}, and consider a model M = (F ,V ) such that, for
some world w, it is the case that M,w ϕ ; in particular, it is the case that M,w∇i(λ i1∨λ i2); let Wi ⊆W
be the set of worlds reachable from w via the universal prefix ∇i, and consider v ∈Wi. If M,v  λ i2 we
can extend M to a model MP = (F ,V P) such that it satisfies p on every world α-reachable from v, if
any, and both substituting clauses are satisfied. If, on the other hand, M,v  ✸αλ , for some t such that
v Rα t we have that M, t  λ ; we can now extend M to a model MP = (F ,V P) such that it satisfies
¬p on t, and p on every other world reachable from v, if any, and, again, both substituting clauses are
satisfied. A reversed argument proves that if M,w ϕ ′ it must be the case that M,w ϕ . If, as a second
case, λ i1 = ¬✸α λ , where λ is a positive literal, then the translating formula is
ϕ ′ = ∇1(λ 11 ∨λ 12 )∧∇2(λ 21 ∨λ 22 )∧ . . .∧∇i(✷α p∨λ i2)∧∇i✷α(¬p∨¬λ )∧ . . .∧∇l(λ l1∨λ l2),
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and the proof of equi-satisfiability is identical to the above one.
In order to prove the second result, we observe that since KKrom,✷N is a syntactical fragment of KKromN
we know that KKrom,✷N w KKromN . It remains to be proved that there exists a formula that belongs to
KKromN and that cannot be translated to K
Krom,✷
N within the same propositional alphabet. Let P = {p},
consider the KHornN -formula
ψ =✸α p,
and suppose by contradiction that there exists a KKrom,✷N formula ϕ such that for every model M over
the propositional alphabet P and every world w we have that M,w  ψ if and only if M,w  ϕ . Once
again, we can safely assume that ϕ = ϕ1∧ϕ2∧ . . .∧ϕl, and that each ϕi is a clause. Consider a model
M = 〈F ,V 〉, where F is based on the set of worlds W , and let w ∈W be a world such that M,w 6 ψ .
Such a model must exist since ψ is not a tautology. Since ϕ is a conjunction of Krom clauses, we have
that there must exist at least one clause ϕi = ∇(λ1∨λ2) such that M,w 6 ϕi. Hence, there must exist a
world w′ such that M,w′ 6 (λ1∨λ2). Now, consider the model M∗ obtained from M by extending the set
of worlds W to W ∗ =W ∪{w∗}, in such a way that w Rα ∗ w∗ and that p ∈V ∗(w∗); clearly, M∗,w  ψ .
We want to prove that M∗,w′ 6 λ1∨λ2. Let us prove the following:
M, t  λ ⇔M∗, t  λ ,
for every t ∈W and positive literal λ . We do so by induction on md(λ ). If md(λ ) = 0, then λ is a
propositional letter (the cases in which λ = ⊤ is trivial): the valuation of t has not changed from M to
M∗, and therefore we have the claim immediately. If md(λ )> 0, then we have two cases:
• λ = ✷β λ ′, and β 6= α . In this case the claim holds trivially, as the β -structure has not changed
from M to M∗.
• λ =✷αλ ′, and λ ′ is a positive literal. By definition, M, t ✷αλ ′ if and only if for every t ′ such that
t Rα t ′, if any, it is the case that M, t ′  λ ′. Clearly, if t 6= w, the set of reachable worlds from t has
not changed, and thanks to the inductive hypothesis, M, t ′  λ ′ if and only if M∗, t ′  λ ′; therefore,
M, t ′  λ if and only if M∗, t ′  λ as we wanted. Otherwise, suppose that t = w. If M, t 6 ✷α λ ′,
then: (i) λ ′ 6=⊤, because ✷α⊤ is always satisfied, and (ii) there exist some t ′ such that t Rα t ′ and
M, t ′ 6 λ ′, and t ′ 6= w∗ (since w∗ is a new world); so, by inductive hypothesis, M∗, t ′ 6 λ ′, which
means that M∗, t 6✷αλ ′. If, on the other hand, M, t ✷α λ ′, then: (i) if λ ′ =⊤, then M∗, t ✷α⊤
independently from the presence of w∗; (ii) if λ ′ = ✷β λ ′′ for some relation β , then observe that
M∗,w∗ ✷β λ ′′ because w∗ has no β -successors for any relation β , and, hence, M∗, t ✷α λ ′, and
(iii) if λ ′ = p, then M∗, t ✷αλ ′ because w Rα∗ w∗ and p ∈V ∗(w∗) by construction.
Since by hypothesis M,w′ 6 λ1∨λ2, the above argument implies that M∗,w′ 6 λ1∨λ2, which means that
M∗,w 6 ϕi, that is, M∗,w 6 ϕ . Therefore ϕ cannot be a translation of ψ , and the claim is proved.
The following result deals with sub-Krom fragments without boxes; as before, the argument of The-
orem 7, based on the product of models, cannot be replicated.
Theorem 9. The following relationships hold:
1. KKrom,✸N ≡KKromN ;
2. KKrom,✸N ≺w KKromN ;
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Proof. The first result is relatively easy to see. Suppose that
ϕ = ∇1(λ 11 ∨λ 12 )∧∇2(λ 21 ∨λ 22 )∧ . . .∧∇i(λ i1∨λ i2)∧ . . .∧∇l(λ l1∨λ l2)
is a KKromN -formula, where, as always, we treat literals as special clauses. There are two cases. Suppose,
first, that λ i1 =✷αλ , where λ is a positive literal. We claim that the K
Krom,✸
N -formula
ϕ ′ = ∇1(λ 11 ∨λ 12 )∧∇2(λ 21 ∨λ 22 )∧ . . .∧∇i(¬✸α p∨λ i2)∧∇i✷α(p∨λ )∧ . . .∧∇l(λ l1∨λ l2),
where p is a fresh propositional variable, is equi-satisfiable to ϕ . To see this, let P the propositional
alphabet in which ϕ is written, and let P ′ = P ∪{p}, and consider a model M = (F ,V ) such that, for
some world w, it is the case that M,w ϕ ; in particular, it is the case that M,w∇i(λ i1∨λ i2); let Wi ⊆W
be the set of worlds reachable from w via the universal prefix ∇i, and consider v ∈Wi. If M,v  λ i2 we
can extend M to a model MP = (F ,V P) such that it satisfies p on every world α-reachable from v, if
any, and both substituting clauses are satisfied. If, on the other hand, M,v ✷α λ i1, for every t such that
v Rα t we have that M, t  λ ; we can now extend M to a model MP = (F ,V P) such that it satisfies ¬p
on every such t (if any), and, again, both substituting clauses are satisfied. A reversed argument proves
that if M,w ϕ ′ it must be the case that M,wϕ . If, as a second case, λ i1 =¬✷αλ , where λ is a positive
literal, then the translating formula is
ϕ ′ = ∇1(λ 11 ∨λ 12 )∧∇2(λ 21 ∨λ 22 )∧ . . .∧∇i(✸α p∨λ i2)∧∇i✷α(¬p∨¬λ )∧ . . .∧∇l(λ l1∨λ l2),
and the proof of equi-satisfiability is identical to the above one.
As for the second relationship, since KKrom,✸N is a syntactical fragment of KKromN , we know that
KKrom,✸N KKromN . It remains to show that the relationship is strict. To this end, we consider the follow-
ing KKromN -formula and we prove that it cannot be translated to K
Krom,✸
N within the same propositional
alphabet:
ψ =✷α p → q.
Suppose, by contradiction, that there exist a conjunction ϕ of box-free Krom clauses, such that for
every model M over the propositional alphabet P = {p,q} and every world w we have that M,w  ψ if
and only if M,w ϕ . Let ϕ = ϕ1∧ . . .∧ϕn, where each ϕi is in its generic form ∇(λ1∨λ2), with λ1 and
λ2 either positive or negative literals. As always, literals are treated as special clauses. Now, consider
a model M = 〈F ,V 〉, where F is based on the set of worlds W , and let w ∈W be a world such that
M,w 6 ψ , and that exists at least one v such that w Rα v. Since M,w 6 ψ , we have that q /∈ V (w) and
for each v such that w Rα v it is the case that p ∈V (v). Since ϕ is a translation of ψ , it must be the case
that M,w 6 ϕ , which implies that there must be a clause ϕi such that M,w 6 ϕi, that is, there must be a
world w′ such that M,w′ 6 (λ1∨λ2). Now, consider the model M∗ obtained from M by extending the set
of worlds W to W ∗ = W ∪{w∗}, in such a way that w Rα ∗ w∗ and that V ∗(w∗) = /0; clearly, M∗,w  ψ .
We want to prove that M∗,w′ 6 ϕi. Let us prove the following:
M, t  λ ⇔M∗, t  λ ,
for every t ∈W and positive literal λ . We do so by induction on md(λ ). If md(λ ) = 0, then λ is a
propositional letter (the cases in which λ = ⊤ are trivial): the valuation of t has not changed from M to
M∗, and therefore we have the claim immediately. If md(λ )> 0, then there are two cases:
• λ = ✸β λ ′, and β 6= α . In this case the claim holds trivially, as the β -structure has not changed
from M to M∗.
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• λ =✸αλ ′, and λ ′ is a positive literal. By definition, M, t ✸α λ ′ if and only if there exist some t ′
such that t Rα t ′ and M, t ′  λ ′. Clearly, if t 6=w, the set of reachable worlds from t has not changed,
and thanks to the inductive hypothesis, M, t ′  λ ′ if and only if M∗, t ′  λ ′; therefore, M, t ✸α λ if
and only if M∗, t ✸αλ , as we wanted. Otherwise, suppose that t = w. If M, t ✸αλ ′, then there
exist some t ′ such that t Rα t ′ and M, t ′  λ ′, and t ′ 6= w∗ (since w∗ is a new world); so, by inductive
hypothesis, M, t ′  λ ′, which means that M∗, t ✸α λ ′. If, on the other hand, M, t 6 ✸αλ ′, then:
(i) λ ′ 6= ⊤, because we have built M in such a way that w has a α-successor, and (ii) for every t ′
such that t Rα t ′ it is the case that M, t ′ 6 λ ′. Since V (w∗) = /0, and λ ′ is positive, for every t ′ such
that t Rα∗ t ′ it is the case that M∗, t ′ 6 λ ′, and, therefore, M∗, t 6✸αλ ′, as we wanted.
This means that M,w′ 6|= λ1 ∨ λ2 implies that M∗,w′ 6|= λ1 ∨ λ2, that is, M∗,w′ 6|= ϕi. This implies that
M∗,w 6 ϕ . Therefore, ϕ cannot exist, and this means that ψ cannot be expressed in KKrom,✸N within the
same propositional alphabet.
Corollary 10. The following results hold:
1. KHorn,✷N and K
Horn,✸
N are ≺-incomparable;
2. KKrom,✷N and K
Krom,✸
N are ≺
w
-incomparable;
3. Kcore,✷N and K
core,✸
N are ≺-incomparable.
Proof. As we have seen in Theorem 5, the Kcore,✸N -formula (which is also a KHorn,✸N -formula) ✸α p
cannot be translated into KHorn,✷N (and therefore it cannot be translated to Kcore,✷N either), over any finite
extension of the propositional alphabet, and, as we have seen in Theorem 7, the Kcore,✷N -formula✷α p→ q
(which is also a KHorn,✷N -formula) cannot be translated into KHorn,✸N (and therefore it cannot be trans-
lated to Kcore,✸N either), over any finite extension of the propositional alphabet. These two observations,
together, show that we cannot compare KHorn,✷N with K
Horn,✸
N , nor K
core,✷
N with K
core,✸
N . Similarly, Theo-
rem 8 proves that the KKrom,✸N -formula ✸α p cannot be translated to K
Krom,✷
N , and Theorem 9 proves that
the KKrom,✷N -formula ✷α p → q cannot be translated to K
Krom,✸
N , all this within the same propositional
alphabet; these two observations, together, imply that, at least within the same propositional alphabet,
we cannot compare KKrom,✷N and K
Krom,✸
N , either.
Corollary 11. The following results hold:
1. KHornN
♣
,KHornN cannot be w-compared with KKromN
♠
,KKromN , and viceversa, for ♣,♠∈ {✷,♦};
2. Kcore,✷N ≺w K
Horn,✷
N and K
core,✸
N ≺
w KHorn,✸N ;
3. Kcore,✷N ,K
core,✸
N ≺KKromN , K
Krom,✷
N , K
Krom,✸
N .
Proof. As far as the first result is concerned, as we have seen in Theorem 1, the formula p∨ q, which
belongs to all sub-Krom fragments of KBoolN , cannot be translated to KHornN , and, therefore, it cannot be
translated to any sub-Horn fragment either, at least within the same propositional alphabet. Theorem 2,
on the other hand, proves that the formula (p∧ q) → r, which belongs to all sub-Horn fragments of
KBoolN , cannot be translated to KKromN , and, therefore, it cannot be translated to any sub-Krom fragment
either, at least within the same propositional alphabet. These two observations, together, imply that
the claim holds. Thanks to the above result, an taking into account that Kcore,✷N = K
Horn,✷
N ∩K
Krom,✷
N
and that Kcore,✸N = K
Horn,✸
N ∩K
Krom,✸
N , the second claim immediately follow. Finally, to prove the third
result it is sufficient to recall that the proof of Theorem 5 shows that the KKromN -formula ✸α p cannot
be translated into Kcore,✷N (over any finite extension of the propositional alphabet), while the proof of
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KcoreN
KBoolN
Kcore,✷N
KKromN
KHorn,✷N
KHornN
KKrom,✸N K
Horn,✸
NK
Krom,✷
N
Kcore,✸N
≡
“is weakly more expressive”
“is more expressive”
PSPACE-hard [12]
Figure 1: An account of the results of this paper.
Theorem 7 shows that the KKromN -formula ✷α p → q cannot be translated into K
core,✸
N (over any finite
extension of the propositional alphabet). Thanks to Theorem 8 and Theorem 9 we know that KKromN ≡
KKrom,✷N ≡K
Krom,✸
N and we have the claim.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we studied the relative expressive power of several sub-propositional fragments of the multi-
modal logic KN. Inspired by recent work on sub-propositional fragments of temporal and description
logic [2, 3, 4, 10], we defined the Horn and the Krom fragments of modal logic, and their box and
diamond fragments. We compared the relative expressive power of the fragments at two different levels,
characterized by respectively allowing or not allowing new propositional letters in the translations, and
the results are shown in Fig. 1. In most cases relative expressivity coincides with syntactical containment,
with the notable exception of the Krom fragments, that are expressively equivalent, but not weakly
expressively equivalent. Because of our very general approach for comparing the expressive power
of languages, most of our result can be transferred to other sub-propositional modal logic such as the
fragments of LTL without Since and Until studied in [2] and the sub-propositional fragments of HS [4,
9, 10]. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work where sub-Krom and sub-Horn fragments of
KN have been considered.
As future work, it would be desirable to complete this picture relatively to the strong hierarchy
(although extending the current results do not seem trivial), and to study the complexity of the fragments
that are expressively weaker or incomparable to KHornN . Because of their lower expressive power, the
satisfiability problem for sub-Krom and sub-Horn fragments may have a lower complexity than full KN,
as our preliminary results seem to suggest, not only in the case of KN, but, also, for some of its most
common axiomatic extensions.
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